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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
GEOFFREY R. STONE*
I want to talk about same-sex marriage. Professor Nussbaum addresses
this topic in Chapter 8 of her book, and it is, in my view, relevant in an
interesting and important way.1
It is inevitable that the Supreme Court will hold the ban on same-sex
marriage unconstitutional. We are at a moment in history that is analo-
gous to the period between 1948, when Justice Roger Traynor, speaking
for the California Supreme Court, held a state law against miscegenation
unconstitutional, 2 and 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court finally em-
braced that view for the nation as a whole. 3 Morally, legally, historically,
and perhaps most importantly, constitutionally, it is right, good, and inevi-
table that the Supreme Court will similarly invalidate the ban on same-sex
marriage.
The Court could take several paths to this result. The Court might
build, for example, on the well-settled precedent that marriage is a funda-
mental personal right and that under the Due Process Clause laws that
deny people the right to marry must be subjected to serious constitutional
scrutiny.4 Or, the Court might build on the Equal Protection doctrine of
suspect classifications, and hold that laws that discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation, like those that discriminate on the basis of race, gen-
der, national origin, religion, and similar considerations must be sub-
jected to serious constitutional scrutiny. Or, the Court might combine
these two themes, as it has in cases like Plyler v. Doe,5 and hold that the ban
on same-sex marriage, like other laws implicating both fundamental per-
sonal interests and suspect or quasi-suspect classifications, must be sub-
jected to serious constitutional scrutiny.
Under any of these approaches, all of which would be quite sensible,
the Court eventually will hold the ban on same-sex marriage unconstitu-
* Geoffrey R. Stone is the Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor at
the University of Chicago.
1. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUs EQUALITY (2008).
2. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (holding that miscegena-
tion laws violated equal protection and discriminated between racial groups).
3. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that marriage restrictions
based on race are unconstitutional).
4. See, e.g., id. at 12 (holding that restricting right to marry based on racial
classifications violates Equal Protection Clause and deprives citizens of liberty with-
out due process); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 400 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that
compulsory sterilization is deprivation of basic liberty); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 390 (1923) (explaining that liberty includes more than just freedom
from bodily restraint).
5. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
(617)
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tional, because there is today no credible justification for that ban that
could withstand serious constitutional scrutiny. Once the analysis moves
beyond the realm of rational basis review, the ban on same-sex marriage
must fall. But I want to suggest that the ban on same-sex marriage is also
constitutionally suspect under the Religion Clauses themselves.
As illustrated by Professor Nussbaum, the Religion Clauses usually are
invoked in two types of situations. First, they may be invoked when the
government directly or indirectly restricts the freedom of individuals to
practice their faith. This sort of claim involves the Free Exercise Clause,
and is illustrated, for example, by a law excluding Muslims from serving as
jurors or prohibiting animal sacrifice by those who engage in such behav-
ior as a part of their religious practice. Second, the Religion Clauses may
be invoked when the government directly or indirectly supports or pro-
motes religious expression or religious activity. This claim involves the Es-
tablishment Clause, and is illustrated, for example, by a law using tax
money to support religious proselytizing, or by a town's display of a cross
on city hall.
I want to explore a third possible claim under the Religion Clauses,
not much addressed in the cases. This claim, which draws on the Estab-
lishment Clause, posits that it is unconstitutional for the government to
enact a law that requires individuals to lead their lives in accord with the
religious beliefs of others. For example, suppose a predominantly Jewish
community enacts a law forbidding any person to sell or consume non-
kosher food or requiring all males to be circumcised, stating expressly in
the law that such rules are demanded by "the tenets of orthodox Judaism."
Or, suppose a predominantly Catholic community enacts a law forbidding
masturbation, stating expressly in the law that such conduct is prohibited
because "masturbation is a sin and is contrary to the word of God." Can
such laws be squared with the First Amendment?
Note that these hypothetical laws do not "establish" a religion in the
traditional sense of a law taxing individuals to pay for religious proselytiz-
ing or erecting a cross on city hall, because they neither promote religious
expression nor forbid religious practice. Eating non-kosher food, not be-
ing circumcised, and engaging in masturbation are not commanded by
anyone's religion. What makes these hypothetical laws problematic is dif-
ferent from what usually makes laws problematic under the Religion
Clauses. Rather than promote or forbid religious expression, these laws
conscript the authority of the state to compel individuals to conform their
behavior to the dictates of a particular religious belief, whether or not the
individuals share that belief.
But do such laws violate the Establishment Clause? In its 1961 deci-
sion in McGowan v. Maryland,6 the Supreme Court made clear that the
First Amendment prohibits legislation that has a predominantly religious
purpose. As the Court explained, a law violates the Establishment Clause
6. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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if its purpose, "evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunc-
tion with its legislative history, or in its operative effect-is to use the
State's coercive power to aid religion."7 Although the First Amendment
vigorously protects the right of religious groups to try to persuade others
to accept their beliefs, it precludes them from conscripting the power of
the state to compel others to act in accord with their beliefs. Thus, to the
extent my hypothetical laws expressly state that their purpose is to legally
enforce religious doctrine, it would be difficult to imagine the Court up-
holding them.
The problem, however, is that religious groups know it would be un-
constitutional for them to openly enact laws expressly for the purpose of
imposing their religious beliefs on others. Thus, like other political actors
who want to enact laws for constitutionally impermissible purposes-for
example, to disadvantage individuals because of their race, gender, relig-
ion, or political views-they will usually attempt to mask their true motives
under cover of purportedly legitimate purposes. In fact, we have seen this
sort of behavior throughout our history.
One notable example occurred at the turn of the nineteenth century
during the Second Great Awakening. The United States was engulfed in
an era of intense evangelical enthusiasm. Millions of evangelicals came to
believe that only Christianity could save America from sin and desolation. 8
From roughly 1800 through the 1840s, evangelical Christians politicked
aggressively for laws to protect the Sabbath, for blasphemy prosecutions,
and for the criminal prohibition of sexually-oriented speech. 9 Although
some evangelicals were open about their desire to use the law to impose
Christian doctrine, such as those who sought to amend the Constitution
"to recognize the authority of Christ,"10 most offered non-religious justifi-
cations for their positions. Laws against Sunday mail delivery were said to
be necessary in order to give people a day of rest, which happened to be
on the Christian Sabbath. Blasphemy prosecutions of those who derided
Christianity, but not other religions, were said to be necessary to prevent
Christians from attacking freethinkers who insulted their religion. And
laws banning sexually-oriented speech were said to be necessary to prevent
the grievous illnesses and deaths that would otherwise result from the
ravages of masturbation. In truth, these were all just efforts to sacralize the
nation.11
7. See id. at 452-53 (explaining that state power cannot be used to advance
religion).
8. SeeJOHN G. WEST, JR., THE POLITICS OF REVELATION AND REASON: RELIGION
AND Civic LiFE IN THE NEW NATION 119-20 (1996) (describing evangelical belief
that society would fall into depravity without moral guidance from Christianity).
9. See id. at 106-17 (discussing voluntary religious associations focusing on
moral reform in early 1800s).
10. See id. at 207-08, 210 (describing moral reform by evangelical reformers).
11. See ROBERT H. ABZUG, COSMOS CRUMBLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND THE
RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION 3-8 (1994) (describing religious reformer's motivations
and visions for sacralizing America and their new religious vocabulary for under-
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The challenge of reconciling the often competing values of democ-
racy, religious liberty, and the separation of church and state was most
recently illustrated by the controversy over California's Proposition 8,
which overturned a California Supreme Court decision holding unconsti-
tutional the state's ban on same-sex marriage. 12 This decision, in my view,
was the moral, legal, historical, and constitutional descendant of the 1947
decision of the California Supreme Court that held miscegenation uncon-
stitutional.' 3 Presumably, Proposition 8 would violate the Establishment
Clause if it had expressly stated that same-sex marriage is banned because
"homosexuality is sinful and same-sex marriage in not sanctioned by God."
But, of course, Proposition 8 said no such thing; that underlying rationale
was left unspoken.'
4
Similar to nineteenth-century disputes over Sunday mail delivery and
closing laws, blasphemy prosecutions, and the ban on sexually-oriented
expression, the proponents of Proposition 8 invoked a variety of non-relig-
ious justifications for the prohibition of same-sex marriage. But despite
those invocations of tradition, morality, and family values, it is hard to ig-
nore that the only honest explanation for Proposition 8 was religion. The
extraordinary efforts undertaken by some religious groups to promote
Proposition 8, in addition to the striking voting patterns revealed in the
exit polls, evidence the religious rationale driving the same-sex marriage
ban. Proposition 8 was enacted by a razor-thin vote of 52% to 48%. 15
Those identifying themselves as evangelicals, however, supported Proposi-
tion 8 by a margin of 81% to 19%, and those who claim to attend church
standing America); see also West, supra note 8, at 207-jo (noting that while most
evangelical reformers limited their goals to moral issues, some reformers actually
wanted government recognition of Christian authority).
12. See In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008) (finding California
law limiting marriage to man and woman unconstitutional).
13. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (holding that miscegena-
tion laws were unconstitutional).
14. See CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE
128 (2008), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/ballot-pdf/2008g.pdf (pro-
viding information and analysis of ballot measures).
PROPOSITION 8
This initiative measure is submitted to the people in accordance with the
provisions of Article II, Section 8, of the California Constitution. This ini-
tiative measure expressly amends the California Constitution by adding a
section thereto; therefore, new provisions proposed to be added are
printed in italic type to indicate that they are new.
SECTION 1. Title
This measure shall be known and may be cited as the "California Mar-
riage Protection Act."
SECTION 2. Section 7.5 is added to Article I of the California Constitu-
tion, to read: SEC. 7.5. Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.
Id. at 128.
15. See DEBRA BOWEN, STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELEG
TION 7, 13 (2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/
sov.complete.pdf (certifying election results for California).
620 [Vol. 54: p. 617
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weekly supported Proposition 8 by a vote of 84% to 16%.16 Non-Chris-
tians, on the other hand, opposed Proposition 8 by a margin 85% to 15%,
and those who do not attend church regularly opposed Proposition 8 by a
vote of 83% to 17%.17 Quite strikingly, the voting patterns reveal that
Proposition 8 was, in large part and in practical effect, a successful effort
by persons holding a specific religious belief to use the authority of the law
to impose their belief on their fellow citizens.1 8
In my view, this represents a serious threat to basic tenets of a free
society that is committed to the separation of church and state. But from a
strictly legal perspective, it is exceedingly difficult for courts to enforce the
First Amendment in the context of laws like Proposition 8. When a law
does not directly restrict religious activity or expressly endorse or promote
religious expression, it is awkward at best for courts to sort out the "real"
purpose of the law. As a consequence, courts are reluctant to invalidate
laws on the ground that they surreptitiously enact a particular religious
faith.
This reluctance was evident in the Supreme Court's most direct en-
counter with this sort of Establishment Clause claim. In McGowan v. Mary-
land, the Court considered the constitutionality of a state's Sunday Closing
Law which, with a few exceptions, proscribed all labor, business, and other
commercial activities on Sunday.19 Although conceding that the law was
originally "motivated by religious forces," the Court nonetheless argued
that "secular justifications [had more recently been] advanced for making
Sunday a day of rest, a day when people may recover from the labors of
the week just passed and may physically and mentally prepare for the
week's work to come." 20 Thus, the "proponents of Sunday closing legisla-
tion," the Court noted, "are no longer exclusively representatives of relig-
ious interests." 21
16. See CNN, CALIFORNIA GENERAL EXIT POLL 6 (2008), http://media.sacbee.
com/smedia/2008/11/05/18/prop8.source.prodaffiliate.4.pdf (last visited April
15, 2009) (identifying trends in voting for or against Proposition 8).
17. See id. (noting religious affiliation of voters in exit polling).
18. No thoughtful person takes seriously the claim that the hostility to same-
sex sex and same-sex marriage is not rooted in Christian religious belief. A few
days after the Scarpa Conference, I was interested to see an op-ed in the New York
Times, written by two scholars who "take very different positions of gay marriage,"
but who thought it uncontroversial that "many Americans of faith and many relig-
ious organizations have strong objections to same-sex unions" and that as a matter
of religious belief they object to being "forced to support or facilitate gay mar-
riage." See David Blankenhorn & Jonathan Rauch, Op-Ed., A Reconciliation of Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at WK1 1. I should note that, because I respect
the principle underlying the Free Exercise Clause, I agree with them that religious
organizations whose faith requires them to resist same-sex marriage should not be
compelled by law to recognize such unions.
19. 366 U.S. 420, 422-24 (1961) (describing laws at issue).
20. See id. at 431, 434 (reviewing purposes for Sunday closing laws).
21. See id. at 431, 434-35 (discussing whether Sunday closing laws establish
religion).
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The Court emphasized that the Establishment Clause does not ban
the "regulation of conduct" merely because the regulation "happens to
coincide ... with the tenets" of the dominant religion, for "in many in-
stances" the "general welfare ... demands such regulation" without regard
to "religious considerations." 22 As an example, the Court pointed out that
murder can be made unlawful "for temporal purposes," even though the
prohibition accords "with the dictates of the Judeo-Christian religions."
23
In the context of the Sunday closing law, the Court reasoned that because
it would be "unrealistic" for the state "to choose a common day of rest
other than that which most persons would select," there was a sufficiently
secular basis for the law to withstand constitutional challenge. 2 4 In clos-
ing, however, the Court emphasized that a Sunday closing law, or any
other legislation, would violate the Establishment Clause if its purpose was
"to use the State's coercive power to aid religion."25
Thus, McGowan evidenced both the principle that a law intended "to
use the State's coercive power to aid religion" is unconstitutional and the
difficulty of applying that principle when secular purposes are advanced in
defense of the law.26 The problem of ferreting out impermissible motive
is common in constitutional law. It occurs not only in the context of the
Establishment Clause, but also in dealing with laws that might have been
motivated by impermissible racial, religious, political, or gender prejudice.
Addressing that challenge is beyond the scope of this essay, but I want to
make a related observation.
That courts may have difficulty ascertaining and candidly naming a
constitutionally impermissible purpose does not mean that that purpose is
legitimate. We know that as responsible citizens we should not support
laws because they advance our discriminatory biases about race, religion,
politics, or gender, even if we could succeed in doing so. We know that as
good and moral citizens we should strive to be tolerant, self-critical, and
introspective about our own values, beliefs, and motives, and to strive faith-
fully to honor our highest national aspirations.
The separation of church and state is one of those aspirations. Re-
gardless of whether courts can effectively intervene in this context, it is just
as un-American for us to violate the separation of church and state by
insidiously using the power of the state to impose our religious beliefs on
others as it is for us to insidiously use the power of the state to implement
our discriminatory prejudices about race, religion, politics, or gender.
22. See id. at 442 (stating that regulations are not invalid merely because they
parallel religious tenants).
23. See id. (discussing murder as example of law that agrees with Christian
morality).
24. See id. at 452 (rejecting other ways states can achieve goal of a day of rest).
25. See id. at 452-53 (finding a statute that used coercive power of state to aid
religion unconstitutional).
26. See id. at 453 (holding that even though Sunday closing law legitimized
Sunday as day of rest, non-religious purposes made law constitutional).
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This is the fundamental point that the advocates of Proposition 8 and of
similar prohibitions of same-sex marriage fail to comprehend. As citizens,
opponents of same-sex marriage are free to support laws because they
honestly believe those laws serve constitutionally legitimate ends, just as
they are free to urge others to embrace and abide by their religious be-
liefs. But what they are not free to do-if they want to be good American
citizens-is to use the law disingenuously to impose their religious beliefs
on others.
It is, to be sure, difficult for individuals to separate the difference be-
tween sound public policy and public morality, on the one hand, and their
personal religious beliefs, on the other. But just as we would expect a
predominantly Muslim community in the United States to strive to know
the difference between their religious beliefs about alcohol and legitimate
concerns about public policy and public morality, so too should we expect
such self-scrutiny and respect for the law by predominantly Christian com-
munities. Conscience, after all, is not just a liberty, but a responsibility.
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